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WHY WE NEED A NEW NORMATIVISM ABOUT
COLLECTIVE ACTION
By Javier Gomez-Lavin1,∗ and Matthew Rachar2,∗
What do we owe each other when we act together? According to normativists about collective action,
necessarily something and potentially quite a bit. They contend that collective action inherently involves
a special normative status amongst participants, which may, for example, involve mutual obligations to
receive the concurrence of the others before leaving. We build on recent empirical work whose results lend
plausibility to a normativist account by further investigating the specific package of mutual obligations
associated with collective action according to our everyday understanding. However, our results cast
doubt on a proposed obligation to seek the permission of co-actors before exiting a collective action, and
suggest instead that this obligation is a function of explicit promising. We then discuss how our results
pave the path for a new normativism, a theory that neither under- nor overshoots the target given by
our common conception of the interpersonal obligations present in collective action.
Keywords: shared agency, collective intention, collective action, interpersonal
obligation, joint commitment.
I. INTRODUCTION
What do we owe each other when we act together? According to normativists
about collective action, necessarily something, and potentially quite a bit. They
contend that collective action inherently involves a special normative status
amongst participants, which may include a variety of obligations, including
obligations to do one’s part, and even to faithfully follow through on other’s
intentions.1 By contrast, according to non-normativists, we might not owe
our partners anything special at all. They argue that some collective actions
may not involve normative relations, and where there are obligations between
participants they’re simply the result of what we owe someone as a person, not
as a co-actor.2
∗ The authors contributed equally to the paper and are listed in alphabetical order
1 An example of a non-normativist view is Bratman (2009, 2014).
2 Examples of normativist views that defend one or more of these obligations include Gilbert
(2009, 2013) and Roth (2004, 2014).
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Previous empirical research suggests that the normativists are on the right
track with respect to capturing our everyday understanding of collective ac-
tion.3 It appears that, according to that understanding, there is a special status
possessed by all participants in a collective action, which structures their de-
liberations about how to carry out the action, results in individual obligations
to perform actions necessary to the completion of the collective action, and
requires that, in order to leave the collective action, an individual make their
withdrawal public. In short, there is an obligation of each either to execute
the action or to notify the others they are leaving. This special status, which
involves normative concepts like obligation and commitment, is present even
in morally wrong collective actions.
Here we present new research that clarifies and deepens our understanding
of how normativity and collective action are associated. Our results suggest
that our everyday intuitions separate kinds of sociality according to the way the
people involved are normatively bound together. People’s sensitivity to these
relations is such that asking them to first consider the presence or absence of
certain normative relations amongst co-actors—such as an obligation to seek
permission to exit a given action—can modify their later judgements about
just how together those co-actors were. Specifically, we’ve found evidence that
asking people about an obligation that isn’t present in collective action reduces
people’s sense that others are together, while asking them about an obligation
associated with collective action cancels out that reduction.
This paper focuses on the most prominent and detailed normativist view,
posited by Margaret Gilbert. We focus on Gilbert for two main reasons. First,
the comprehensive nature of her view enables it to generate a range of empirical
predictions about participant judgements. One of these predictions is unique
to her view, namely that judgements of togetherness will be associated with
judgements that there is an obligation to seek the permission of co-actors before
leaving a collective action, even in minimal cases that do not include further
obligation-generating features like reliance or mutual assurance. Our empirical
research was developed in part to test this particular judgement about collective
action. As such, it engages most directly with her work. Secondly, Gilbert was
the focus of previous empirical research, which argued that normativists have
the upper hand, and so, the next natural step for empirical investigation on
this topic is to test whether her particular version of normativism is well suited
to the task of explaining collective action.
Because of this emphasis we introduce the issues of collective action and
normativity by way of a discussion of her view, which then leads into our
presentation of the empirical results. A key result suggests that, with respect to
our intuitive conception of collective action, Gilbert’s view gets the normative
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relations involved in collective action wrong. Our results show that the obliga-
tion to seek the permission of co-actors before leaving is not associated with
collective action, but rather with promising, a distinct kind of sociality that is
not essential for collective action. We go on to argue that, given the structure
of Gilbert’s view and the argumentative strategy she employs, these empirical
results are particularly consequential for her.
Finally, we turn to the upshot of this research for theories of collective
intention and action in general. Our results replicate earlier findings suggesting
that our common understanding of collective action is normativist, from which
we conclude that there is reason to prefer a normativist view of collective
intention. We will not here argue that all extant normativist views are subject
to the criticisms we raise against Gilbert’s view. Instead, we hope to show that
since the standard normativist account gives the wrong picture of the package
of normative relations involved in collective action, what we need is a new
standard normativism.
I.1 Normativism and the Obligation to Seek Permission
Following most people in the philosophical literature, we’ll assume that (1)
there is a pre-theoretical conception of acting together that goes beyond the
production of a non-distributive outcome; (2) this pre-theoretical phenomenon
cannot be adequately dealt with in terms of personal intentions with regular
contents and mutual belief or common knowledge, that is, in terms of strategic
reasoning and mutual responsiveness; and, (3) if we are doing something
collectively, then we collectively intend to do it.4
All three of these points are assumed by Gilbert, who gives us the fullest
account of the relation between acting together in the sense specified and
normativity. The fundamental concept in Gilbert’s account of collective (or
shared) intention and action is joint commitment.5 Our collectively intending
something is a matter of being jointly committed to doing that thing.6 And,
per (3), which we can think of as the collective version of the simple view of
intention,7 we are collectively doing something when we collectively intend to
do it.8 This gives us the basic structure of Gilbert’s view, although not much of
an explanation: joint commitments are primitive and provide the foundation
for collective intentions, and collective intentions explain collective actions.9
4 Gilbert (2009, 2013), Alonso (2009), Roth (2004, 2014), and Bratman (2009, 2014) accept
versions of these assumptions.
5 Consult, e.g., Gilbert (2013).
6 Consult, e.g., Gilbert (2013: 83).
7 In its weaker form, the simple view of intention states that if A intentionally ϕ’s, then A
intends to ϕ.
8 Gilbert (2013: 89) adopts the stronger, biconditional version of the simple view.
9 Gilbert uses ‘joint commitment to intend’, ‘collective intention’, and ‘shared intention’
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Joint commitments are commitments necessarily involving two or more peo-
ple. They are not reducible to, nor are they mere concatenations of, personal
commitments. Say we are jointly committed. It is not that I am committed
and you are committed. Instead, the joint commitment is a commitment of
ours, that is, you and I as a team or unit. What makes Gilbert a normativist is
that joint commitments to intend necessarily involve interpersonal obligations
and entitlements. In her words, ‘obligations and correlative rights inhere in
any joint commitment’ (2013: 49–50). In other words, the process by which
joint commitments are created—mutual expressions of readiness to joint com-
mit under conditions of common knowledge—is also an obligation-generating
process. This gives us her ‘obligation criteria’ for shared intention: ‘each party
to a shared intention is obligated to each to act as appropriate to the shared
intention in conjunction with the rest’ (2009: 175). Acting appropriately to the
shared intention involves attempting to promote the fulfilment of the shared
intention, not acting contrary to it, and being subject to rebuke for failing to
fulfil these obligations. These obligations are relational and specific. Having
a joint commitment entails that ‘one is obligated ‘to’ a particular person or
persons, as well as obligated ‘to do’ something or other’ (2000: 104). Also impor-
tant is the fact that obligations of joint commitment are directed, ‘non-moral’
obligations.10
Just as joint commitments require the will of all to be brought into existence,
and, in turn, they require the will of all to be rescinded. No party to a joint
commitment has the power to end the joint commitment simply by changing
their mind. Because it is a commitment of ours, only we can rescind it. For an
individual then, ending a joint commitment to intend involves either success-
fully executing the behaviour it specifies or getting each of the participants
to express their readiness to end it. This is expressed succinctly in Gilbert’s
‘concurrence criterion’: ‘absent special background understandings, the con-
currence of all parties is required in order that a given shared intention be
changed or rescinded, or that a given party be released from participating in it’
(2009: 173). This ensures that co-actors cannot unilaterally leave a joint com-
mitment without being subject to rebuke. Attempting to do so is not ending
the joint commitment but violating it.
Taking stock, Gilbert’s view is an instance of a normativist view. According
to her, when we are acting together in the sense of collaboration or partnership,
we are jointly committed. This normative state involves a special standing with
respect to other’s actions. Each of us is obligated to do our part, on pain of
rebuke, and to receive the assent of the others before leaving.
10 This feature of Gilbert’s account is explored in the previous empirical research, see Gomez-
Lavin & Rachar (2019: Study 6). Consult Gilbert (2009: 184) for an argument for this claim based
on the idea that there can be joint commitment obligations in immoral collective actions. She
elsewhere notes the difference between obligations of joint commitment and other kinds of
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II. THE WALKING CASE: THE OBLIGATION
TO SEEK PERMISSION
Previous empirical research on collective action found evidence for an obliga-
tion to notify other joint actors when exiting a collective action. This provides
initial support for normativist views in general, but Gilbert’s view involves
significantly more. Because of her claim that, just as joint commitments must
be created by all, they can be rescinded only by all, she is committed to the
view that no one can unilaterally exit a collective action. Each participant has
an obligation to seek the permission of the other participants before leaving.
This entailment is expressed in her ‘concurrence criterion’, stated above, and
is made explicit in several places in her writing.11
In order to test whether the obligation to seek permission is present in our
common conception of collective action we modified the original paradigm by
adding new measures and conditions. The original paradigm features what has
been labelled the ‘Walking Case’, a series of vignettes adapted from thought
experiments offered by both Gilbert and Bratman in defence of their respective
normativist and non-normativist theories of collective action.12 The original
Walking Case involves three conditions: the first, serving as the control, presents
no evidence that the two people are walking together; the second, borrowed
directly from Bratman, presents minimal evidence; and the third increases
those behavioural signals. In each case, one participant in the walk suddenly
peels off. These vignettes serve as the basis for our Control, Low Collective Action,
and High Collective Action conditions.13
Here we included a further fourth condition that involved an explicit ex-
change of promises, both to determine whether judgements of togetherness
would increase above and beyond the other conditions, and to test whether ex-
plicit promises have a different effect on our measures than other behavioural
signals that the participants are acting together. There is significant philosophi-
cal interest in comparing promises to other behavioural signals for the following
reason. If there is no difference between the no collective action condition—
that is, our Control condition—and the collective action conditions, and there
is a difference between the collective action conditions and the Promising con-
dition, then it looks as though seeking permission is a function of promising
rather than collective action. But if there are significant differences between
11 Consult, in addition to the above citations, Gilbert (2000, 2009).
12 Consult Gomez-Lavin & Rachar (2019). The Walking Case is a useful entry point into the
debate since it generates different predictions by normativists and non-normativists. Bratman
(2006: 7), as well as Alonso (2009: 471, fn. 76), claim that it does not involve obligations because
it does not involve reliance or mutual assurance. Gilbert (2013: 25–7), on the other hand, is
committed to the claim that does involve obligations, because it is a genuine instance of acting
together.
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the Control condition and each of the other three conditions, then it looks like
seeking permission is a function of the collective action, rather than promising,
as Gilbert’s view would predict.
II.1 Method and predictions
After being randomly assigned to one of these four conditions, our 214 Amer-
ican, adult participants (47% self-identified as female) read the respective
vignette and responded to our two dependent measures, which were displayed
in random order and are listed below14:
1. Togetherness Measure: ‘To what extent were the two people acting together’
anchored at 0 (‘Not at all’) and 6 (‘Totally working together’).
2. Permission Measure: ‘Does the person who peels off have to seek permission
to leave from the person who stays?’ anchored at 0 (‘Not at all’) and 6
(‘Totally’).
Following earlier studies, we hypothesized that participants would rate togeth-
erness significantly higher in the Promising condition, the High Collective Action
condition, and the Low Collective Action condition compared to the Control con-
dition, but not between Low Collective Action, the High Collective Action, and the
Promising conditions.15 That is, ratings of togetherness should not scale linearly
with additional behavioural evidence of joint action; once an action is judged
to be a collective action, then it is judged that the actors are acting together. With
respect to the second measure, we adopted Gilbert’s perspective, generating
the hypothesis that participants will rate the appropriateness of seeking per-
mission significantly higher in the Promising, the High Collective Action, and the
Low Collective Action conditions compared to our Control condition. Again, fol-
lowing Gilbert, we hypothesized that there should be no significant difference
amongst permissibility ratings for our three collective action conditions. That is,
14 Participants were assigned as follows: 58 to our Control condition, 52 to our Low Collective
Action condition, 50 to our High Collective Action condition, and 54 to our Promise condition. An
additional 32 participants were excluded from further analyses for either failing to complete the
study or failing one of our two ‘Bot Checks’ (reproduced in Part B of the Appendix). Sample sizes
were determined by consulting Gomez-Lavin & Rachar’s (2019) similar paradigm. Furthermore,
an average of 48 participants per condition was established using the G∗Power software analysis
tool based upon the median differences amongst the three conditions in their Study 4, which most
closely mirrored our own present design (original Control mean, hereafter ‘m,’ m ∼ 1, Low Joint
Action m ∼ 3 yielding an approximate 20 participant per condition sample size, with comparisons
between Low Joint Action and High Joint Action [m ∼ 4] yielding an approximate 76 participant per
condition sample size. As the midpoint of these two analyses approximated 48 participants, we
chose to recruit ten additional participants to mitigate for any who failed to complete the survey
or were excluded for failing our ‘Bot Checks’).
15 Predictions for each, alongside a qualitative summary of our results, are contained in
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Figure 1. A box and whisker plot comparing participant responses across our dependent measures in
the Walking Case. These represent the distribution of participant ratings amongst our conditions and
measures, with ‘×’ representing the mean and thick, horizontal bars representing the medians (where
no bar is present, the median is at 0). ‘Whiskers’ represent the lowest and highest quartile responses,
and boxes represent the middle two quartile responses.
according to Gilbert, the obligation to seek permission should be concomitant
with participants’ judgements that an action is in fact a collective action.
II.2 Results
Our results speak against these normativist hypotheses. As expected, partici-
pant ratings were not normally distributed and thus required the use of non-
parametric statistics.16 We found a significant main effect across both of our
dependent measures.17 Participants successfully tracked increasing evidence
of collective action between our Control condition (median, or ‘mdn’ = 1) and
our additional Low (mdn = 2.5) and High (mdn = 4) Collective Action and Promise
(mdn = 4) conditions (refer to Fig. 1). While there was a significant difference
between our Control compared to all other conditions, our participants also gave
significantly higher ratings of togetherness in the High Collective Action condition
16 Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk tests for all our conditions p < 0.05. Non-normal
data were expected and are in-line with prior research with similar paradigms in different areas
of experimental philosophy (Fingerhut et al 2021; Gomez-Lavin and Rachar 2019; Diaz, Viciana
and Gomila 2017).
17 Kruskal–Wallis independent samples tests: H(3) = 32.798, p < 0.001, E2R = .154 for to-
getherness, and H(3) = 13.004, p = 0.005, E2R = 0.061 for permission. Consult Table 11 in Part
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compared to the Low Collective Action condition, unlike in prior studies.18 Even
though in prior studies the separation of togetherness scores for the Low and High
Collective Action conditions was trending towards significance, our present result
is surprising.19
As for our new Permission Measure, while we did find a significant main effect,
this was largely driven by participants’ ratings in our Promise condition (mdn =
3), rather than our Low and High Collective Action conditions. That is, participants
gave significantly higher permission scores in our Promise condition, than in
our Control (mdn = 0) and Low Collective Action conditions (mdn = 0).20 It is worth
emphasizing that in the Low Collective Action condition the median score was
0. Additionally, the separation of scores between our Promise and our High
Collective Action conditions (mdn = 1) was trending towards significance.21 And
comparisons of participant ratings for permission between our High Collective
Action and our Low and Control conditions were not significant.22
II.3 Discussion
There are two main upshots of the results of this study: one for the validity of
the earlier experiments and the other for Gilbert’s view of collective intention.
First, these data raise the possibility that the central measure for togetherness
failed to cleanly replicate between this study and the previous empirical work
on collective action. In earlier work, there was no linear increase between Low
and High Collective Action conditions, which is what generated our hypothesis.
That there was such an increase here is surprising and potentially problem-
atic for this empirical paradigm, since the materials and methods are nearly
identical: the only modifications were the replacement of the prior Notification
Measure with our present Permission Measure, and the addition of a fourth, Promise
condition. Given that our design is between-subjects, only the substitution of
our Permission Measure for the original Notification Measure could account for the
diminished ratings of togetherness—which was particularly pronounced amongst
our Low Collective Action conditions.23 Because of the importance of this result
for calling into question the validity of the earlier research on collective action,
18 Pairwise comparison: z = 2.98, p = 0.003, r = 0.295. For further results consult Tables 2
and 4 in Part A of the Appendix.
19 Results of Gomez-Lavin & Rachar’s (2019) Mann–Whitney pairwise test between ‘low’ and
‘high’ joint action conditions: z = 1.506, p = 0.061, uncorrected for multiple comparisons.
20 Mann–Whitney pairwise tests: control versus promise conditions (U = 1057, z = 3.158,
p = 0.002, r = 0.298), low versus promise condition (U = 986, z = 2.768, p = 0.006, r = 0.269).
21 Mann–Whitney pairwise test: U = 1064, z = 1.919, p = 0.055, r = 0.188.
22 Mann–Whitney pairwise tests: control versus high conditions (U = 1216, z = 1.587,
p = 0.112, r = 0.156), low versus high condition (U = 1156, z = 1.038, p = 0.299, r = 0.103).
23 Present Low Collective Action median = 2.5. Median for the counterpart condition in Gomez-
Lavin & Rachar (2019) = 3. For comparison, the median of our present High Collective Action = 4,






/pq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pq/pqab028/6296440 by guest on 28 June 2021
WHY WE NEED A NEW NORMATIVISM ABOUT COLLECTIVE ACTION 9
we developed a new experiment to test whether the new Permission Measure
modulated participants’ togetherness ratings. This follow-up study is described
and discussed in Section III.
Secondly, the results for the Permission Measure suggest that, pace Gilbert,
the obligation to seek permission does not appear to be a function of acting
together, but rather of promising. On Gilbert’s view, the normative relations
come as a package. Once involved in a collective action, the participants are
obligated to each other in characteristic ways. Our results radically diverge
from predictions based on her view. In the Low Collective Action condition, for
example, our participants judged that the characters are acting together, but
that there is no obligation to seek permission, dramatically so. The median
score was 0. Further, there was a significant difference between the Low Col-
lective Action condition and the Promising condition, suggesting that, unlike the
obligation to notify, we need more robust forms of interaction than acting to-
gether to generate the obligation to seek permission; we need to promise. Since
judgements about permission do not track judgements of collective action, it
seems that exiting a collective action does not require seeking the permission of
the co-actors.
III. ORDER-EFFECT STUDY
Because the results of our first study do not match the results of earlier re-
search on collective action with respect to togetherness, we designed a follow-up
study in order to measure whether, and to what extent, our new Permissibility
Measure affected participants’ ratings on our Togetherness Measure. As explained
in the previous section, participants gave higher togetherness ratings for our High
Collective Action and Promise conditions than in our Low Collective Action condition.
This result was not expected, as togetherness ratings in prior research utiliz-
ing a similar paradigm (Gomez-Lavin and Rachar 2019) did not significantly
increase between Low and High Collective Action conditions; rather, it seemed as
though once a given threshold of evidence that characters in the vignette were
together was crossed, participants gave elevated (e.g. above the mid-point) rat-
ings of togetherness. As prefaced, this raises the possibility that we have failed
to replicate prior findings, and motivates further analysis to determine the
contributing factors present.
Only two differences exist between our present study and prior published
research, namely the presence of our new Permissibility Measure and the addition
of a fourth condition. As our design is between-subjects, only our new measure
could account for our divergent results. Starting from the idea that the order in
which participants consider and rate each measure may affect their perception
of the situation, our hypothesis is that the new Permissibility Measure dampened
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consider the question ‘Does the person who peels off have to seek permission
to leave from the person who stays?’, their demonstrated reticence to agree
with such a norm—as evidenced by their low permission ratings in all but
our Promise condition—may prime or colour their further consideration of
whether the characters in the vignette were acting together. In other words,
being asked about permission highlights a potential normative bond between
the characters in the vignette, but it is a potential normative bond that the
characters do not actually share, focusing our participants’ attention on a
way in which the characters are separate. So, because our participants do not
think there is an obligation to seek permission, they are primed to think that
the characters are independent, lowering their judgements about the extent
to which the characters are acting together. At the same time, it is likely
that we did not observe much of a dampening effect due to our introduction
of the Permissibility Measure in the High Collective Action condition because of
its robust description of the characters’ coordinated behaviour, namely their
walking, chatting, and laughing together. The liminal nature of the behavioural
descriptions in our Low Collective Action may have allowed for the malleability of
participant perceptions caused by the introduction of our new measures. As our
measures were randomly presented in our first study, we cannot determine the
order in which each was presented to any given participant, hence motivating
our present study.
III.1 Methods and predictions
To determine whether our Permission Measure influenced togetherness ratings,
and whether this influence is tied to the order in which participants considered
our questions, we designed a between-subjects study featuring five variants of
our Low Collective Action condition. We chose to focus on this condition as it
strongly deviated from prior results using a near identical paradigm, unlike data
from our Control and High Collective Action conditions. Additionally, it displayed
the most variability of any of our test conditions in our first study.24 As a
comparison, we chose to directly replicate Gomez-Lavin & Rachar’s (2019)
paradigm as described in their Study 4. Their experiment features a Notification
Measure, asking participants ‘Should the person who peels off notify the other
that they’re leaving?’ anchored at 0 (‘No obligation at all to notify’) and 6
(‘Total obligation to notify’). Though these anchors are more descriptive than
those for our present two measures, we chose to keep them identical to the
earlier paradigm in order to allow for the cleanest replication. This allowed us
to directly compare participants’ ratings of each normative relation and their
effects, if any, on our Togetherness Measure.
24 Low Collective Action togetherness standard deviation (hereafter ‘SD’) = 1.923, High Collective
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As in our first study, we recruited 192 American adult participants from
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (44% self-identified as female) who were
randomly assigned to one of the five conditions below:
C1. Notification First. Participants first answered the Notification Measure,
followed by the Togetherness Measure on a separate page, n = 37.
C2. Permission First. As above, with participants first answering the Permis-
sion Measure, n = 31.
C3. Notification Second. Participants first answered the Togetherness Measure,
followed by the Notification Measure on a separate page, n = 37.
C4. Permission Second. As above, with participants answering the Permission
Measure on a separate page, n = 45.
C5. Simultaneous Presentation. Here participants were asked to answer all
three measures, randomly ordered, after reading the vignette, n = 42.
As mentioned above, we predict that participants’ togetherness ratings will be
significantly dampened when they’re asked to consider the Permission Measure
first, as in Condition 2. We also expect that, consistent with the prior pub-
lished research and our first study, participants will give significantly lower
ratings for our Permission Measure than for the new Notification Measure across
all conditions. Finally, we expect that when presented simultaneously, as in
Condition 5, participants should give intermediate togetherness ratings due
to the normative tension generated by participants’ reticence to agree with
Gilbert’s concurrence criterion, and our expectation—based on prior pub-
lished research—that they will largely agree with the Notification Measure.25
III.2 Results
The results supported our predictions, with one exception. As with our
first study, data were not normally distributed, necessitating the use of non-
parametric statistics.26 When comparing all non-simultaneous conditions (i.e.
Conditions 1 through 4), we did find evidence for a significant main effect
across our normative measures, and evidence for a main effect of our Together-
ness Measure across conditions was trending.27 These results were not surprising,
as we expected scores on our Notification Measure to be substantially higher in
the conditions where they were present than scores for our Permission Measure.
We also predicted a substantial deviation of Togetherness ratings on only one
25 Again, for a complete description of our predictions, their confirmation-status, and our
statistical tests, consult Tables 5–10 in Part A of the Appendix.
26 Shaprio–Wilk and Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests for all conditions p < 0.011.
27 Kruskal–Wallis independent samples tests: H(3) = 6.864, p = 0.076, E2R = 0.046 for to-
getherness, and H(3) = 51.97, p < 0.001, E2R = 0.35 for our normative measures. Consult
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Figure 2. A box and whisker plot comparing participants’ ratings on our Togetherness Measure across
our five conditions. Medians for all conditions, except in Condition 2 where participants were tasked
with first answering our Permission Measure, are identical at 4.
of the non-simultaneous conditions, namely Condition 2. This is borne out
explicitly in our data, and is made clear in Fig. 2.
Focusing first on Togetherness, ratings given in Condition 2, in which
participants were required to give a score on the Permission Measure first,
were significantly lower (mdn = 2) than ratings for any other condition (all
mdns = 4), including in our Simultaneous Condition 5 (all pairwise compar-
isons against Condition 2: p ≤ 0.05).28 These results both confirm our first
prediction and suggest that our nearly significant main effect obtained for
Togetherness ratings above was largely driven by participants’ lower Togetherness
scores in Condition 2 where they were asked about our Permissibility Measure
first. Furthermore, this confirms our suspicion that in our first study, as re-
ported above, the significant separation between Togetherness scores in the Low
and High Collective Action Conditions—which was not expected and raised the
possibility that this paradigm failed to cleanly replicate from prior published
work—can be explained by the introduction of our new normative measure.
Comparing scores for our two normative measures, participant ratings for
the Notification Measure (all mdns = 5) were in each case significantly higher than
their ratings for Permissibility (all mdns = 1, all pairwise comparisons between
Permissibility and Notification scores, p < 0.001), including in the Simultaneous
28 Mann–Whitney pairwise comparisons for our togetherness measure: Permission First ver-
sus Notification First (U = 417, z = 1.976, p = 0.049, r = 0.239), versus Notification Second
(U = 387, z = 2.349, p = 0.019, r = 0.285), versus Permission Second (U = 517, z = 1.957, p =
0.05, r = 0.224), versus Simultaneous Presentation (U = 460, z = 2.195, p = 0.028, r = 0.257).
Pairwise comparisons amongst other conditions all p ≥ 0.39, consult Tables 6 and 10 in Part A
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Figure 3. A box and whisker plot comparing participants’ ratings for our Notification and Permission
Measures across our five conditions. Recall that participants were tasked with answering our Notification
Measure in the first two conditions from the left (i.e. ‘Notify 1’and Notify 2’), our Permission Measure in the
last two conditions from the left (i.e. ‘Perm. 1’ and ‘Perm. 2d’), and both measures in the ‘Simultaneous’
condition. The median response for the Notification Measure in our Simultaneous condition was also 5.
condition.29 This is made very clear in Fig. 3. These results also confirm our
second prediction; namely, that participants are far more reticent to agree with
Gilbert’s concurrence criterion than with other norms, such as the obligation
to notify that one is exiting a collective action.
In our Simultaneous condition, participants’ ratings were surprisingly con-
sistent with their ratings in other conditions. That is, their ratings for the
normative measures were not significantly different from normative ratings
in other conditions (all pairwise comparisons between similar normative
measures p ≥ 0.592).30 More interestingly, Togetherness scores in the Simul-
taneous condition (mdn = 4) were only significantly different from scores
from Condition 2, where participants were asked to respond to the Per-
missibility Measure first (mdn = 2, pairwise comparison p = 0.028). Instead,
Togetherness scores were very similar to those conditions in which partici-
pants were asked to respond to our Notification Measure, or when they were
asked to rate Togetherness first. Unlike our prediction, then, Togetherness scores
were not at all dampened by the presence of the Permissibility Measure when
participants were also asked to consider whether there is an obligation to
notify.
29 For full results, consult Tables 8 and 10 in Part A of the Appendix.
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Figure 4. A box and whisker plot comparing participant responses for all three measures in our
Simultaneous condition. The median for participants’ responses in our Notification Measure was at 5 on
our scale.
Finally, consistent with our second prediction, participant ratings for Per-
missibility were significantly lower than their Notification scores (consult Fig. 4)
for results from Simultaneous condition.31
III.3 Discussion
Our results show that the order in which the measures were presented to
our participants does indeed affect their judgements of togetherness. Being
directed towards a normative bond that doesn’t exist between the characters is
enough to lead our participants to judge that the characters are less together,
explaining the discrepancy between the earlier research and our first study
with respect to judgements of togetherness.
Interestingly, our results also suggest that the presence of the Notification
Measure overrides whatever dampening effect is produced by participants’ re-
luctance to agree with Gilbert’s concurrence criterion. Our interpretation of
these results is based on the idea that there is a plurality of kinds of social-
ity.32 Drawing our participants’ attention to the obligation to notify points to
a kind of sociality or togetherness between the characters, which is present,
while drawing their attention to the lack of an obligation to seek permission
points them to another, which is missing. When they see the questions at the
same time, they judge that the characters are engaged in some form of so-
ciality, just not one that would generate the obligation to seek permission.
31 Wilcox signed rank test: z = 5.042, p < 0.001, consult Table 11 in Part A of the Appendix.
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But, our participants seem to recognize that the fact that one form of sociality
involves a different set of normative requirements than another does not entail
any judgement about how much togetherness that first form of sociality in-
volves. So, when the possibility of the plurality of sociality is not made explicit,
because the participants only see the Permission Measure, they tend to lower their
judgements of togetherness. But, when plurality is made explicit, because they
are presented with both questions, their judgement about the absence of one
kind of normative relation doesn’t affect their judgements of togetherness.
This result strongly suggests that, at least with respect to the attendant
normative relations, acting together and making promises are distinct social
phenomena, with the obligation to notify associated with collective action and
the obligation to seek permission associated with promising.
IV. GENERAL DISCUSSION
The main consequence of these results is that there is no empirical support
for Gilbert’s claim that her concurrence criterion is a legitimate criterion for
assessing theories of collective intention. People can act together without being
obligated to seek other’s permission to leave, according to our participants.33
And, there is evidence that seeking permission is a function of something
not essential to collective action, namely promising. This suggests that both
aspects of the concurrence criterion are mistaken. In addition to the lack of
a requirement to seek permission, the background conditions Gilbert refers
to also work the other way. Absent special understanding, for example given
by promises, people judge that co-actors can unilaterally leave some collective
actions without wronging each other, so long as they notify the other party of
their intent.
The significance of these results can be brought into focus by considering
Gilbert’s theory of promising.34 Gilbert offers a theory of promising on which
promises are special instances joint commitments. They are special instances
because they must be created by an explicit process, which is not required for
all joint commitments, and they have asymmetric content—only the promisee
is obligated to perform specific actions as part of the content of the promise—
which also is not a general feature of joint commitments.35 Gilbert argues for
33 We would like to note one direction of further research that would deepen this interpretation
of the consequences of the empirical research for Gilbert’s account. Gilbert does not require that
the request for permission be couched in explicit terms, potentially blurring the lines between
informing one’s partner and implicitly requesting permission. While we attempted to capture
this in our measure by contrasting ‘seeking permission’, which may be implicit or explicit, with
‘notifying’, which does not, to us, connote awaiting release from one’s partner, we do think that
more research is called for to further explore the subtleties this issue raises.
34 Consult, e.g., Gilbert (2013: Ch. 12 and Ch. 13).
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her straightforward application of her theory of joint commitment to promising
by pointing out the similarity of normative requirements between promising
and joint commitments. Both generate directed obligations and both grant
the promisee the ‘power of release’, the ability to rescind the promise upon
request.36 Gilbert argues that this corresponds to the obligations stemming
from the concurrence criterion.37 However, since our empirical results give us
reason to doubt whether the obligation to seek permission is genuinely a part of
collective action but no reason to doubt whether it is part of a promise, Gilbert
is faced with a problem. There is no longer a correspondence between the nor-
mative situation in collective action and the normative situation in promising,
so a direct application no longer seems plausible. Since they have two different
sets of normative requirements, according to our common understanding, it
is hard to see how one concept can explain both without appealing to some
further features. Either joint commitments explain situations in which there is
an obligation to seek permission with the corresponding power of release or
they explain situations in which there is an obligation to notify but no obliga-
tion to seek permission. They cannot straightforwardly explain both. Because
joint commitments entail an obligation to seek permission, it appears they are
better suited to explain promising than collective action.
With respect to collective action, we have only shown that Gilbert’s thought
experiments do not generate the intuitions they are supposed to, according to
her. However, as there is no empirical evidence to the contrary, we have reason
to think that an obligation to seek the permission of the other participants
before leaving is not a part of our everyday conception of collective action.
Further, because of methodological differences between Bratman and Gilbert,
the fact that the entailments of Gilbert’s normativist view do not match up
to our studies carries more weight than the results of the earlier studies that
conflict with Bratman’s non-normativist view.
Bratman adopts a functionalist view, characterizing roles that intention
plays in the individual case according to his ‘planning theory of intention’
and then extending them to the collective case.38 According to Bratman,
we have independent reason to think that planning structures are central to
our individual agency, and we can then investigate whether they also explain
social phenomena. The foundational role he grants to a technical philosophical
concept of intention gives him some distance from everyday intuitions, allowing
36 This power is widely held to be an important part of promising. See, for example, Hart
(1955: 180), Feinberg (1992: 188–9), Scanlon (1998: 301), and Owens (2012: 219–26).
37 Gilbert recognizes that this leads to a potential conflict. The conflict arises because joint
commitments are symmetrical—all parties have to receive permission from the other to rescind
the joint commitment—while promises appear asymmetrical. Only the promisor is required to
get the permission of the promisee to rescind the promise. But Gilbert denies this, claiming that
the promisor has some ability to deny release from the promisee (2013: 319).
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him room to argue that our participants may be mistaken, for example by
confusing rational requirements with interpersonal obligations. But it doesn’t
leave him too much space, since he also claims that his philosophical account
serves as a model for something that ‘broadly coheres with pre-analytic talk
of shared intention and of shared intention and shared cooperative activities’
(2014: 86). Bratman’s extension of his views of planning agency is theoretically
interesting insofar as what it explains actually is a prevalent form of sociality,
which, one may think, would be reflected in our everyday understandings of
what is required of people when they act together. Rather than serve as a
counterargument to Bratman’s view then, the empirical results instead suggest
certain explanatory limitations of it.39
By contrast, Gilbert sets up her account as explaining ‘shared intention
sentences’, such as ‘We’re going to go shopping’. A shared intention is nothing
more than ‘what people refer to when. . . they utter everyday sentences of the
form, for example, “We intend to do A”, “We’re going to do A”, and the like,
and are not using them elliptically for “We both intend to do A”’ (Gilbert 2009:
168). This is special case of Gilbert’s approach to many social phenomena, and
she gives a compelling defence of the idea that one of the values of philosophy
comes in revealing, clarifying, and articulating everyday concepts so that they
can be used in the social sciences.40 One of these everyday concepts concerns
the ‘togetherness’ involved in acting together. Given this approach, the relevant
question for evaluating Gilbert’s view of collective intention on its own terms
is not how well it explains the functional roles of intention applied to the
collective case, but whether it matches up to everyday uses of shared intention
sentences.
A consequence of this methodological framing is Gilbert’s particular sus-
ceptibility to the empirical results on offer. Her argumentative structure places
her judgements about the everyday features of collective action at the founda-
tion. In her most direct response to Bratman, her argument runs as follows.41
39 Bratman also adopts a second methodological strategy that mitigates the force of the
empirical research in evaluating his view (2014). He holds that an account of shared intention
may be combined with an independent account of interpersonal normativity which generates
associated mutual obligations. He suggests a principle from the work of T.M. Scanlon based on
mutual assurance, which does so. Our research here also casts doubt on that particular principle’s
ability to explain the interpersonal normativity of collective action, since that principle also
entails an obligation to seek permission. However, the general strategy is still available, and so,
further normative theorizing based on a different principle, for example based on reliance—a
strategy explored in depth in Alonso (2009)—may find a connection between Bratmanian shared
intention and interpersonal obligation that does account for judgements about the obligation to
notify without generating an obligation to seek permission. For critical discussion of Bratman’s
and Alonso’s theories, consult Rachar (2021). In general, we see the results of the empirical
research as providing good reason to engage in that project of normative theorizing and theory
revision.
40 This extended argument runs through her work, but is highlighted in her (1989).
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After introducing the topic and generally characterizing various potential po-
sitions, she attempts to establish the three conditions for an adequate account
of collective action introduced above, the ‘disjunction criterion’, the ‘obliga-
tion criterion’, and the ‘concurrence criterion’. The basis for these ‘everyday’
criteria is nothing more than ‘observations on the way people think and talk
about shared intention in everyday life’,42 which are illustrated through a se-
ries of collective action thought experiments meant to elicit the appropriate
intuitions. The concurrence criterion is then used in the argument against
views like Bratman’s and for her joint commitment account. The fact that her
thought experiments do not elicit the intuitions she thinks they will, at least in
the case of the concurrence criterion, means that there is a deep problem for
Gilbert. It is not simply that there is some mismatch between the philosophical
account and our everyday view or that it fails to explain one judgement but
provides an explanation of the rest; rather one of her underpinning premises
is false.
Both Bratman and Gilbert implicitly accept that the ability to explain
features of the form of sociality embodied in our collective actions is a reason
to favour one view of collective intention over another. Combining the results
of these studies with the results of previous empirical research casts doubt on
the ability of both of the two most prominent accounts of collective intention
to explain everyday features of collective action. While Bratman’s view, in its
current form, is unable to explain judgements about certain obligations in
minimal and morally wrong collective actions, Gilbert’s view overexplains,
predicting judgements about stronger normative relations than are present in
cases that do not involve promising. But only Gilbert rests the central argument
for her view on intuitions about everyday cases. Our results here serve as a good
reason to think that her intuitions are not widely shared, and so the concurrence
criterion should not be accepted as an everyday feature of collective action.
Since Gilbert’s joint commitment view entails the concurrence criterion, it is
an inadequate view of collective intention, on its own terms. So, while our
results give further reason to think that broadly speaking a normativist view
is well placed to explain our everyday understanding of collective action, it
appears that Gilbert’s is not.
Before concluding, it is important to stop and consider the hybrid nature
of this project, which brings empirical methods to bear on central theoretical
issues in social philosophy and ethical theory. Though this work shares a lin-
eage with other recent developments in experimental philosophy, we think it
is valuable to explicitly delineate the epistemic role that our use of empirical
tools and statistical analyses can play within philosophical theorizing. When
philosophical argumentation depends on the evidentiary role of readers’ in-
tuitions elicited by carefully crafted scenarios that serve as intuition pumps,
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as is the case with both normativist and non-normativist positions on collec-
tive action, we can then use empirical tools to examine the scope, impact,
and psychological factors that may drive the intuitions on which these argu-
ments depend. Importantly, the data derived from such explorations do not
alone serve to overturn what are ultimately complex theoretical viewpoints,
nor could empirical investigation alone replace them. The philosophical the-
ories we evaluate using these methods offer more than a set of particular
obligations between participants; they construct theoretical explanations of
these normative relations by proposing sources, grounds, or justifications of
them. This contribution goes beyond what can be captured using empirical
methods. Rather, when analyses suggest that there is a mismatch between the
intuitions expected to arise and those that do, it can serve as a starting point
for further reflection and possible theoretical revision—as our project demon-
strates. As such, we should appreciate these tools as complimentary—and not
antagonistic—to the process of understanding the social and ethical world that
we inhabit. We want to know both what norms of collective action we accept
and what justifies or explains those norms. A full normativism, then, will not
only be sensitive to our social practices, it will also offer a normative theory of
collective action.
V. CONCLUSION
Normativist views hold that collective intentions inherently involve obligations
and entitlements between co-actors. They therefore seem well placed to explain
the results of earlier empirical research, replicated here, that suggests there are
obligations between participants even in minimal and morally wrong cases of
collective action in our everyday conception of collective action.
Gilbert’s joint commitment view of collective intention entails that we have
an obligation to seek the permission of the other participants to leave a col-
lective action. The reason Gilbert’s view has this entailment is her claim that
collective intentions are formed and rescinded by will of all. She holds that
only once all have expressed their readiness is anyone committed, and only
once all have given their permission is anyone released, which generates the
obligation to seek permission. The experimental research presented here sug-
gests that there is no such obligation in people’s everyday understanding of
acting together. In their judgement, there are minimal cases of collective ac-
tion that do not involve an obligation to seek permission and the obligation to
seek permission is only unambiguously present in cases that involve an explicit
exchange of promises.
Because the structure of Gilbert’s argument explicitly rests on the intuitions
that lead her to her three conditions (disjunction, obligation, and concurrence),
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which all views of collective intention should be sensitive. If collective inten-
tions explain collective actions, we have reason to prefer views that explain
the features of collective action revealed by experimental research. Based on
the empirical research so far, both of Gilbert’s and Bratman’s views have
significant difficulties doing so. Bratman’s has difficultly because our under-
standing of collective action appears to be normativist, Gilbert’s because it
gets the normative relations wrong. To explain collective action then, we need
a new standard normativism.43
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APPENDIX, PART A: TABLES
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Notes. Table 1 collects our predictions for between-condition significant differences for our Togetherness
Measure in Study 1. Where present, bold italicized notes summarize results that were not in agreement
with our predictions.
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Notes. Table 2 collects the results of Mann–Whitney U pairwise tests conducted between conditions for
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Notes. Table 3 collects our predictions for between-condition significant differences for our Permission
Measure in Study 1. Where present, bold italicized notes summarize results that were not in agreement
with our predictions.
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Notes. Table 4 collects the results of Mann–Whitney U pairwise tests conducted between conditions for
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Table 5. Predictions and Results for Togetherness Measure in Non-Simultaneous Cases, Study 2
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Notes. Table 5 collects our predictions for between-condition significant differences for our Togetherness
Measure in Study 2. Comparisons against our Simultaneous condition are reserved for Tables 9 and 10.
Table 6. Pairwise Tests for Togetherness Measure in Non-Simultaneous Conditions, Study 2
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Notes. Table 6 collects the results of Mann–Whitney U pairwise tests conducted between conditions,
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Table 7. Predictions and Results for Normative Measures in Non-Simultaneous Cases, Study 2
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Notes. Table 7 collects our predictions for between-condition significant differences for our two nor-
mative measures used in Study 2, i.e. our Notification Measure as presented in the Notification First
and Notification Second conditions and our Permission Measure as presented in the Permission First
and Permission Second conditions. Comparisons against our Simultaneous condition are reserved for
Tables 9 and 10.
Table 8. Pairwise Tests for Normative Measures in Non-Simultaneous Cases, Study 2









































Notes. Table 7 collects the results of Mann–Whitney U pairwise tests conducted between conditions in
Study 2, except the Simultaneous condition, for our two normative measures. Again, our Notification
Measure was used in the Notification First and Notification Second conditions, and our Permission
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Table 11. Comparison of Main Effects Across Studies
Togetherness Measure Normative Measure(s)
Study 1:
Featuring Permission Measure, n = 214
H(3) = 32.798 p < 0.001,
E2R = 0.154
H(3) = 13.004,
p = 0.005, E2R = 0.061
Study 2:
Conditions 1–4, Featuring both normative
measures, n = 150
H(3) = 6.864 p = 0.076,
E2R = 0.046





– z = 5.042,
p < 0.001∗∗
∗∗ Using a Wilcoxon signed rank test as data across the normative measures in the Simultaneous Condition
in Study 2 are from paired samples.
Notes: Table 11 catalogues the ‘main effects’ obtained from our studies. For the first two non-header
rows, Kruskal-Wallis independent samples tests were used and p-values are corrected for multiple com-
parisons. As our Simultaneous condition required comparing data from across the same participants,
these data were excluded and were tested via a Wilcoxon signed rank test with that result described in
the following row. For pairwise comparisons of participants’ Togetherness scores across the Simultaneous
and other conditions, consult Table 10. Epsilon-squared effect sizes for Kruskal-Wallis tests, E2R were
obtained with the following formula:
E2R = H(n 2−1)/(n+1)
APPENDIX: PART B
Study 1: Vignettes and Study-Specific Measures
Conditions
Control. Two people are independently walking down Fifth Avenue. Start-
ing at 65th street, they walk beside each other, until, as it happens, one of them
peels off at 59th street.
Low Collective Action. Two people are independently walking down
Fifth Avenue. They spot each other at 65th street, and they briefly walk
together, chatting, until, as it happens, one of them peels off at 59th street.
High Collective Action. Two people are independently walking down
Fifth Avenue. They spot each other at 65th street, and they walk together,
chatting, laughing and maintaining their pace, until, as it happens, one of
them peels off at 59th street.
Promising. Two people are independently walking down Fifth Avenue.
They spot each other at 65th street, and promise to walk together to 55th
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Dependent Measures
1. Togetherness Measure: ‘To what extent were the two people acting together’
anchored at 0 (‘Not at all’) and 6 (‘Totally working together’).
2. Permission Measure: ‘Does the person who peels off have to seek permission
to leave from the person who stays?’ anchored at 0 (‘Not at all’) and 6
(‘Totally’).
On Following Page
3. Please give us a one sentence explanation of your prior answers. (Limited
to 200 characters).
Study 2: Vignettes and Study-Specific Measures
Vignette
Low Collective Action. Two people are independently walking down
Fifth Avenue. They spot each other at 65th street, and they briefly walk
together, chatting, until, as it happens, one of them peels off at 59th street.
Dependent Measures
1. Togetherness Measure: ‘To what extent were the two people acting together’
anchored at 0 (‘Not at all’) and 6 (‘Totally working together’).
2. Permission Measure: ‘Does the person who peels off have to seek permission
to leave from the person who stays?’ anchored at 0 (‘Not at all’) and 6
(‘Totally’).
3. Notification Measure: ‘Should the person who peels off notify the other that
they’re leaving?’ anchored at 0 (‘No obligation at all to notify’) and 6 (‘Total
obligation to notify’).
On Following Page
4. Please give us a one sentence explanation of your prior answers. (Limited
to 200 characters).
Conditions
1. Notification First. Participants first answered the Notification Measure, fol-
lowed by the Togetherness Measure on a separate page.
2. Permission First. As above, with participants first answering the Permission
Measure.
3. Participants first answered the Togetherness Measure, followed by the Notification
Measure on a separate page.
4. Permission Second. As above, with participants answering the Permission
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5. Simultaneous Presentation. Here participants were asked to answer all
three measures, randomly ordered, after reading the vignette.
Demographic Measures and Comprehension Checks
Notes. These questions followed the dependent measures for each of the previous studies.
Demographic questions (Q1–Q4) were randomly presented with other ques-
tions on the following pages. Were there were multiple non-‘Other/prefer not
to answer’ answers, they were randomly presented at the top of the list. Af-
terwards, participants were given a semi-unique code to enter into Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk platform to receive their payment.
Q1. Would you consider yourself religious?
0 = Yes
1 = No
2 = Other/prefer not to answer
Q2. Would you consider yourself female or male?
0 = Female
1 = Male
2 = Other/prefer not to answer





4 = Other/prefer not to answer
Q4. How would you describe your political values?
Likert scale anchored at 0 (‘liberal’) to 6 (‘conservative’)
Comprehension Check:






Notes: Questions and answers were represented as bitmapped images. Answers
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